In the late 1980’s I was lucky enough to work at a Mainframe site that was performing early testing for MVS/ESA and DFP Version 3, namely DFSMS. So what you say! The main ethos of DFSMS was in fact System Managed Storage and the ability to define policies to manage data, and the system (DFSMS) would implement these policies. Up until this point, there was no easy way of controlling data set allocation and managing storage space.
Conversely, the three mainstream Mainframe security subsystems, in no particular and so alphabetical order, ACF2, RACF (Security Server) and Top Secret have always had the ability to define a security policy and for said policy to be processed as and when the associated resource was accessed. So why is it that so many security risk registers are full of “things to do” from a security viewpoint? Where did it all go wrong?
In the late 1980’s, Guide and SHARE, in Europe anyway, were separate entities, and these organizations had some influence with IBM regarding direction for various IBM Mainframe technologies. Not much has changed as of today, but the organizations have merged and for Europe, now we have GSE. From a DFSMS viewpoint, there was a significant amount of user input regarding how DFSMS might be shaped, and the “System Managed Storage” ethos. I wonder whether such user input, or indeed focussed collaboration from Mainframe security gurus might help with the RACF or Mainframe security technical policy challenge?
Having worked with multiple IT security focussed organizations (E.g. NIST, DoD) over the last few decades, Vanguard Integrity Professionals has been actively involved in creating and evolving NIST DISA STIG Checklists. These checklists (currently 300+ checks and growing steadily) provide a comprehensive grounding for z/OS RACF policy checking, and seemingly are gaining momentum in being accepted as a good starting point to assist organizations define and monitor their z/OS RACF (ACF2 & Top Secret in the near future) policy.
These DISA STIG checklists contain step-by-step instructions for customer usage to ensure secure, efficient, and cost-effective information security that is fully-compliant with recognized security and therefore Mainframe security standards. Being fully compliant with DoD DISA STIG for IBM z/OS Mainframes, these checklists provide organizations with the necessary procedures for conducting a Security Readiness Review (SRR) prior to, or as part of, a formal security audit.
To increase automation and thus reduce cost, Vanguard has optimized the DISA STIG checking process with their Configuration Manager solution. Configuration Manager can perform Intrusion Detection DISA STIG checks and report findings in just a few hours instead of the hundreds or thousands of hours it may take using standard methods. Potentially, Configuration Manager enables organizations to easily evolve from continuous monitoring to periodic compliance reporting.
Maintaining tight control over the security audit and compliance process is a critical imperative for today’s enterprises. To comply, enterprises must show that they have implemented procedures to prevent unauthorized users from accessing corporate and personal data. Even if enterprises have the means to efficiently conduct audits, they often lack the tools necessary to prevent policy and compliance violations from reoccurring. As a result, security vulnerabilities remain a constant threat, exposing companies to potential sanctions and erode the confidence of investors and customers.
As a result, the process of meeting compliance standards such as those found in the Combined Code issued by the London Stock Exchange (LSE) and the Turnbull Guidance (the Sarbanes-Oxley equivalent for publicly traded companies in the UK), the Data Protection Act 1998 (and, for the public sector, the Freedom of Information Act 2000), the regulations promulgated by the Financial Services Authority (FSA) (the FSA has oversight over the various entities that make up the financial services industry), standards set by Basel II, the Privacy and Electronic Communications Regulations of 2003, the HMG (UK Government) Security Policy Framework, the Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard (PCI DSS) and various UK criminal and civil laws, represents one of IT’s most critical investments.
As a consequence, managing security in the Mainframe environment is becoming an increasingly difficult task as the list of challenges grows longer every day. Even the most experienced Security Administrators can labour under the workload as security systems increase in size and networks grow in density.
So where does the Mainframe Security Administrator start to make sense of how to achieve security compliance for their particular business?
Although there are many security and compliance regulatory requirements with supporting policy frameworks, none of these high-level mandates actually drill-down to the technical level and thus provide RACF or equivalent Mainframe (ACF2, Top Secret) policy guidelines!
There are synergies between various global organizations that define security standards. This is certainly true for NIST and ISO/IEC. Page viii of the NIST SP-800-53 policy states:
NIST is also working with public and private sector entities to establish specific mappings and relationships between the security standards and guidelines developed by NIST and the International Organization for Standardization and International Electrotechnical Commission (ISO/IEC) 27001, Information Security Management System (ISMS).
Furthermore, the seemingly ubiquitous Annex A of ISO 27001 is also cross-referenced by this NIST SP-800-53 policy, and the various controls and monitoring points are cross-referenced, where largely, the requirements of the NIST standard are mapped in the ISO/SEC standard, and vice versa. Please refer to Appendix H of the NIST SP-800-53 policy, which cross-references NIST SP-800-53 with ISO/IEC 27001 (Annex A) controls.
Put simply, one must draw one’s own conclusions as to the robustness of NIST SP-800-53 vs. ISO/IEC 27001, but both security standards seem to have commonality as robust and acceptable security standards. So maybe Mainframe users all over the world can define and deploy a generic and robust baseline Mainframe technical security policy, vis-à-vis, the NIST DISA STIG checklists…
We must also recognize the IBM Health Checker for z/OS, which also has the ability to perform automated RACF policy checks. This facility includes some ready-to-go checks for standard system services, in conjunction with a facility that allows the user to define their own policy checking rules. Without doubt, the IBM Health Checker for z/OS is a worthy resource that should be leveraged from, but for RACF, if each Mainframe user defines their own policy checking rules, maybe there is the possibility for a significant duplication of effort. For the avoidance of doubt, although RACF resource naming standards might be unique to each and every Mainframe user, there is a commonality of ISV (E.g. ASG, BMC, CA, Compuware, IBM, SAS, et al) software subsystems and products they deploy. If only we could all benefit from previous lessons learned by “standing on the shoulders of giants”!
Perhaps the realm of opportunity exists. There are many prominent Mainframe security giants actively involved today, including the authors of ACF2, Vanguard Software, Consul (Tivoli zSecure), naming but a few. Is it possible that there could be one common standard that might be used as a technical policy template, based upon the ubiquitous 80/20 rule? So deploying this baseline would deliver 80% of the work required for 20% of the effort, where the unique Mainframe customer just customizes this policy as per the resource naming standards in their Mainframe Data Centre? Equally the user has the ability to contribute to this template, perhaps using a niche software product not commonly used that requires security policy checks, where said software product is deployed in maybe tens of Mainframe customers globally.
Vanguard clearly has put a lot of effort into evolving the DISA STIG resource for Mainframe, IBM also has their RACF Health Checker, but what about one overseeing independent organization, which could benefit from the experience of Mainframe security specialists, and moreover, real-life field experience from Mainframe users globally, implementing and refining these standards. Wasn’t that the essence and spirit of Guide and SHARE several decades ago, listening to Mainframe users and evolving Mainframe technology accordingly? Of course SHARE in The USA and Guide Share in Europe, IUGC and APUGC in the APAC region still perform this function admirably, but seemingly with the NIST DISA STIG resource, we already have a great baseline to leverage from.
What is the size and shape of this potential task, ideally to identify each z/OS software product that has specific interaction with the security subsystem (I.E. ACF2, RACF, Top Secret), typically via resource profiles? For a software z/OS product to be developed, the ISV will have interacted with IBM, initially via their PartnerWorld resource for product development, and eventually via the IBM Global Solutions Directory from a Marketing viewpoint. As of Q4 2012, the IBM Global Solutions Directory contains ~1,800 ISV’s with z/OS based software products.
However, recognizing there are already good security resource checklist templates in existence, vis-à-vis the solid foundation primarily provided by Vanguard via the DISA STIG checklists, the best organization to add to these DISA STIG checklists are the ISV’s themselves. The ISV has most knowledge about their product, having written the code and supporting documentation for security related control; so a modicum of effort from the ISV that has product specific security resource checking seems the best way forward.
In 2003 IBM launched a Mainframe Charter initiative, demonstrating their commitment to the Mainframe platform, where they adopted nine principles organized under the pillars of innovation, value, and community. Although this was an IBM initiative, wouldn’t it be great for the Mainframe ISV to proactively be part of this global Mainframe community, and assist their Mainframe customers simplify the activity of implementing and monitoring their Mainframe security technical policy? Not every ISV will have software products with specific security resource interaction, and therefore not every product in the ISV software portfolio will require a security checklist. The amount of work per software product to create a template might only be several hours, and so could the ISV produce these checklists as part of their day-to-day customer support activities?
Is it possible that globally, we can all participate and collaborate in a focussed and Mainframe security centric group, to define a technical policy template that will assist all Mainframe customers satisfy regulatory compliance mandates? No one of us is as good as all of us…